

S E C R E T

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

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The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense  
The Pentagon  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Intelligence support to our military forces in Europe was the focal point of my 6-14 November 1982 trip to Europe, where I conferred with commanders and principals at SHAPE, Headquarters USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE. In addition, I visited the AFCEM/AAFCE static war headquarters at Boerfink and key intelligence activities in Berlin. I returned with information and views which I wish to share with you, at the same time expressing appreciation for your Department's support to my trip.

At SHAPE and within the U.S. Commands in Germany, I found the strategic and intelligence conception to be one of a Warsaw Pact threat being steadily enhanced by greater air power and fire power being deployed in an increasingly forward and threatening way. This perception is strengthened by intelligence indicating certain force reorganizations and development of a new concept for the formation of Operational Maneuver Groups (OMG), highly mobile combined arms teams apparently designed to exploit breakthroughs developed by Warsaw Pact assault forces.

U.S. and NATO tactical concepts have evolved for striking enemy rear areas (at present, primarily with air forces) to delay and destroy follow-on formations deep in Eastern Europe before they can come to bear on the battle area. There are political and budgetary impediments to the implementation of this strategy, but our common stake in a conventional defense which can raise the nuclear threshold should be sufficient to overcome these impediments. More difficult is satisfying the acute need for more secure communications and intelligence from deep in Eastern European territory in order to effectively target the OMG and second echelon forces.

ARMY review completed.

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Preceding my visit to Europe was an exchange of letters with General Bernard Rogers, in his capacity as SACEUR, copies of which I am attaching. Because the correspondence was in NATO and not in U.S.-only channels, my response to Gen. Rogers dealt in general terms with CIA and U.S. Intelligence Community support to SHAPE. Nevertheless, the exchange with Gen. Rogers proved to be very helpful, as it served to alert me to issues which came up repeatedly during my trip.

These issues pertain to the CIA's and the Intelligence Community's capabilities to provide reliable and timely Early Warning of aggression by the Warsaw Pact and to the availability of clandestine assets which could augment action of conventional military forces in the field under combat conditions. My conclusion from this trip is that both the CIA and the Intelligence Community need to re-examine their capabilities to ensure that they respond insofar as feasible to war-fighting requirements as well as to the related but dissimilar requirements for peacetime collection. I have asked Admiral Burkhalter, Director Intelligence Community Staff, to work with the DoD and intelligence agencies in seeking ways to enhance our capabilities in these areas.

I do not expect this re-examination to result in major changes. I returned from Europe confident that the separate specialization and focus of our civilian and military collectors, as described in my letter to Gen. Rogers, are appropriate and effective. In the HUMINT area, I see an advantage in having the civilian operatives of the CIA concentrate worldwide on clandestine collection against the politico-military decision making echelons of our adversaries, while military intelligence officers in the field with requisite specialized qualifications focus on potential hostile military activities and on our opponents' order-of-battle. It is clear to me that we need more agents in both categories, but the way to get them is not through blurring the distinctions between the categories or between the respective responsibilities and expertise of the CIA and the various military intelligence organizations.

I would, however, expect to see some changes in the following areas as a result of this re-examination:

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--- The excellent and impressive briefings I received from officers of the U.S. Army 66th MI Group substantiate my belief that it is both feasible and of great importance to recruit HUMINT sources in Eastern Europe to provide Indications and Early Warning as well as Order of Battle intelligence. I recognize the enormous difficulties in clandestine operations of this kind. I believe worthwhile results are being achieved through the program of the 66th MI Group and I recommend that further resources be made available to the 66th to expand its program. I also encourage the further development of Air Force clandestine programs against air targets in Eastern Europe.

--- Apart from anticipated wartime intelligence-sharing problems which are discussed below, existing peacetime security "compartments" for intelligence products seem to be causing problems of distribution at SHAPE and, to a lesser extent, in USEUCOM, USAREUR and USAFE. I will see what changes can be made without undue risk to security of sources and methods.

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To deal with these intelligence needs we require a stronger effort to apply national intelligence systems, together with training and technical capabilities, in support of Allied Commands in Europe. The goal would be to have in wartime the means for expeditiously passing the fruits of our national and theater collection systems to all affected field headquarters, not merely to our own. This will include allied national headquarters (such as the corps) and the major international field headquarters subordinate to SACEUR. Possible approaches toward this goal include:

A) negotiations within the Alliance to generate sufficient resources to fund and staff the necessary analytic, communications, and operational entities to tie the various national and NATO operational headquarters in with U.S. intelligence systems; and

B) renegotiation of the principle of intelligence as a "national responsibility" to take cognizance of the primacy of U.S. systems. This would envision the institution of a comprehensive U.S. theater intelligence support network for the Alliance in return for offsetting efforts by the Allies in other areas.

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In conclusion, my trip helped me to see more clearly differences between the intelligence needs of consumers in Europe who might have to fight a war there and those of us in Washington who require intelligence to help deter one. I will carry some of these insights into my subsequent discussions with you and other members of the National Security Council and will be most appreciative of hearing your views on these same subjects.

Sincerely,

**7s/ William J. Casey**

William J. Casey

Attachments

- A. Letter from General Bernard Rogers to the Head of the U.S. Clandestine Intelligence Service.
- B. Letter of Reply from DCI Casey to General Rogers.

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C-O-P-Y

3 November 1982

General Bernard Rogers  
Supreme Allied Commander Europe

Dear General Rogers,

With reference to your recent letter to me and to the heads of other Intelligence Services of the Alliance on the subject of SACEUR intelligence requirements, you may be assured that I welcome this and any future opportunities to discuss this subject with you. I was particularly pleased that your letter calls for focus upon the key intelligence need -- early recognition of Warsaw Pact intent and preparations for conflict.

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Turning to your needs for intelligence after hostilities have commenced, I want to comment in particular about coverage of enemy activities in areas subject to overrun.

Sincerely,

/S/

William J. Casey  
Director of Central Intelligence